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Risk-Return Profiles of New Ventures: 
An Empirical Study
Robert H. Keeley 
and Lassaad A. Turki
This study examines how risk evolves in private, venture capital backed 
companies. It finds that the stochastic Ito processes assumed for public companies 
probably apply to young, private companies as well. However, the parameters, 
drift rate and standard deviation, are generally higher. Venture capitalists have 
viewed companies as evolving through stages, and this study assesses the 
probabilities of success and failure at each stage. The underlying process of price 
evolution appears much smoother than the stage model may suggest. The 
valuation mediods developed for public securities, including option pricing, 
should apply to private companies as well. This study is a step toward measuring 
the needed parameters.
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an investigation of the evolution of risk in startup companies. It 
focuses on companies financed with venture capital, companies which aspire 
to become publicly held at some point. Most will not become public, but 
those which do presumably will exhibit the relatively stationary risk 
characteristics typical of public companies—once they have become seasoned 
public issues. The questions for this paper are:
How to describe the risk of a startup and how to measure it;
Whether the new company moves through definable stages, and if so 
how the transitions affect its risk;
Measuring risks and associated changes in value of companies which 
are privately held;
How to describe the evolution of risk as a company matures and 
eventually becomes publicly-held, presumably exhibiting the relatively 
stationary risk properties, which other studies have found for public 
companies (e.g. Blume, [3]; Fama and MacBeth, [5]).
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Startup companies have received considerable attention in fields aside 
from finance. The interest stems from findings that new companies are major 
creators of new jobs in the United States, and of new industries such as work 
stations, personal computers, and biotechnology. If new corporate ventures, 
which are less observable but have the same underlying characteristics, are 
added to independent startups, their combined influence on growth and 
technological progress is very large indeed. A specialized financial 
intermediary, venture capital, has emerged in the last thirty years to meet 
the needs of some startup companies, and has been studied as part of the 
broader issue of financial intermediation (Amit et. al. [1]; Chan [4]). But the 
theoretical and empirical work which led to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
to Option Pricing and to their many extensions has not been applied to new 
companies. That is, we have no idea whether startup companies come close 
enough to meeting the requirements of existing valuation models that those 
models may be useful for valuing startups; nor do we have any estimates 
of the relevant parameters (beta coefficients, variances and the like). Two 
reasons lie behind the neglect of startup companies by financial researchers 
interested in security prices:
•  Lack of data: the value of startup companies is not easily observed, 
because they trade infrequently and on private markets.
•  Low priority: their aggregate value is small compared to the public 
market (the venture capital community manages about $30 billion in 
funds, a little over 1 percent of the value of public equities).
We believe the first problem can be solved, at least partially. Venture 
capitalists have been investing in over 200 startups per year for at least a 
decade; so a database of at least a few hundred transactions could be 
assembled. Although this inevitably falls far short of the detail available in, 
say, the daily CRSP tapes, it may be enough to make some rough inferences.
The low priority accorded to startups by financial researchers may be 
misplaced. Many corporate investments in plant and equipment, as well as 
in research and development, have the characteristics of a startup; namely, 
the need to make a series of investments before the project becomes a cash 
generator, high risks associated with a new technology and a new market, 
and the potential for rapid growth if the project succeeds. In fact, these new 
venture investments are precisely the ones that U.S. companies have been 
accused of avoiding. Such investments pose difficulties for traditional 
discounted cash flow methods using CAPM derived discount rates. Their 
expected cash flows are hard to assess, because of wide variance. The character 
of the project changes rapidly over its first few years. And the investment 
is a form of call option, which requires a series of payments in order to keep
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the option alive. Because it is an option, traditional risk adjustments are not 
sufficient; and because it is a compound option, requiring multiple 
investments, the simpler option formulae are not suitable either. If the project 
succeeds, its value will be heavily tied to “growth options” (Pindyck [10]) 
as well as to its observable cash flow. And, the relevant risk parameters, beta 
coefficients and variances in value, are even less observable than they are for 
a typical investment, where an analogous public security often exists.
This study is an exploratory step toward describing the “price process” 
(i.e. the equation describing the way the price changes over time) of a startup 
company. Section 2 identifies stages of development through which new 
companies pass, and estimates the probability of success at each stage. The 
latter estimates are based on a sample of 203 firms taken from the portfolios 
of three venture capital firms. Section 3 theorizes about the underlying 
stochastic process which produces the observed probabilities of success at 
each stage. Section 4 describes the sample of prices. Section 5 makes some 
rough estimates of risks and returns at each stage and discusses the 
implications regarding the underlying stochastic process. Section 6 
summarizes the findings.
2. STAGES o r  DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW COMPANY
Researchers recognize that a new company changes dramatically as it 
develops a product, introduces it into the market, and, if successful, builds 
a self-supporting organization. They have proposed various taxonomies of 
which we will briefly discuss three. Bell [2] proposes a six-step progression 
based on his personal exposure to the computer industry over a 30 yeair period:
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Concept
•  Seed
Product Development
•  Market Calibration (Early marketing)
•  Market Expansion
•  Steady State
Ruhnka and Young [12] survey 73 venture capital investors, asking 
them to differentiate among stages of development, if appropriate, and to 
describe the stages as to characteristics, goals, and risks. Most responses 
identify 5 stages, although the characteristics of the stages vary considerably 
depending on the respondent. The most common response identifies all 
of Bell’s stages except “Concept,” which typically pre-dates a venture 
capitalist’s involvement. Kazanjian [7] develops a four stage model.
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positing that companies deal with a series of dominant problems: first with 
product development, then production, then sales and finally with 
organizational development. His survey of 105 young companies supports 
the idea diat a CEO’s priorities shift over time, generally following the stages 
which he proposes.
Each of the three describes events marking the boundaries of a stage. 
Ruhnka and Young’s boundaries vary depending on the respondent, but 
generally speaking all three recognize introduction of the first product as a 
dear transition, and divide the first few years of sales into two parts: establishing 
a toehold, eind then building up to a solid position. They also agree on a final 
stage in which a company becomes an established competitor. Thus the 
differences among Bell, Ruhnka and Young, and Kazanjian arise from events 
prior to introducing the first product. Bell has three stages, Ruhnka and Young 
have two, and Kazanjian has one (conception and development).
None of the three discusses in detail what happens in the event of failure. 
Kazanjian views a company as cycling within a stage until it succeeds. Bell 
also allows cycling, as well as retreat to the previous stage, or possibly going 
out of business. Ruhnka and Young simply catalog the likely causes of failure.
These three studies, using different sources of data, agree closely enough 
that we began with their sequence (using the five stage version) for a 
successful company, and then tested its descriptiveness by asking a few 
venture capitalists to use it to categorize a random sample of their 
investments. We also filled out the sequences for failures by asking the 
venture capitalists to trace the possible paths of several failures. The resulting 
fraimework is shown in Figure 1. A new company may begin at either the 
seed (I) or startup (II) stage, 95 percent in our sample began at II. If successful 
at developing a product, it then moves to early marketing (III), and, if its 
success continues, it goes to early expansion (IV). If not successful, it may 
seek a new direction (V-1 or V-2) or close down (VI). A company which 
succeeds with early expansion (IV-1) may move on to sustained success (VII- 
1)—at which point it has typically become a major force in its industry, and 
can be viewed as equivalent to its older competitors; or, it may have a setback 
(VII-2) and need to attempt a turnaround. Other branches of Figure 1—VIII 
through XII—deal with the company’s choices when it does not succeed at 
various points in its history.
Table 1 describes each of the stages of Figure 1 and identifies the event 
that signals completion of a stage.
Theories and empirical studies of equity price movements have never 
concerned themselves with stages of development, in part because they 
concentrate on mature firms. They usually assume a firm’s price is in some 
steady state characterized by a drift rate and a variance (which may be a 
function of the firm’s characteristics and the variance of the market).
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Organization researchers may look at the same firms and see evidence of large 
changes in structure and management methods, similar to some of the 
changes undergone by startups (e.g. Miller and Mintzberg, [9]). But such 
changes will not necessarily affect the underlying equity price process. Thus, 
our first question is whether a sequence of transitions, as described in Table
1, requires a departure from the common assumption that a company’s stock 
price follows an Ito process with a constant drift and variance.
3. THE PRICE PROCESS FOR A NEW VENTURE
New venture financing differs from a typical transaction in common stock 
in some notable ways:
Stepwise Investing: A new venture usually requires financial support 
for its first few years, and investors typically supply that support in a series 
of steps. With each financing we may observe a value for the venture. In 
most cases, at least when the venture does well, each new step involves 
investment by some new investor as well as the old ones.
Financing Steps vs. Stages of Development: The financing steps do 
not necessarily coincide with the stages of a company’s development, 
described in section 2. However, venture capitalists have stated that they try 
to finance one stage at a time, and for the purposes of this paper, financings 
will be treated as occurring at the boundaries between stages. When 
transactions occur in the middle of a stage (an infrequent event), we will 
ignore them, using only the ones which occur roughly at the boundaries 
of stages. When a company moves through a stage without a financing, we 
will leave out that company, in order to avoid observing a return which 
clearly combines two stages.
Financing Prices vs. Market Prices: In this paper we will treat the price 
at each step as a market price, the price which would exist if a large number 
of well informed buyers and issuers existed and were able to transact at no 
cost. That view may be reasonable when a new investor participates, but not 
all of our observed prices stem from such transactions. And, we will often 
not know whether a new investor participated. We would expect that the 
price of an “insider only” transaction would not exceed the price which an 
outsider would pay, and it may be less.
Rates of return: Since calculation of a rate of return requires two price 
observations, a “market” return requires that a new investor participate in 
two consecutive financings. Observed returns, which may not have new 
investors in both transactions, may deviate from market returns, which by
Risk-Retum Profiles of New Ventures 93
definition require a new investor in both transactions. In addition, a 
company’s first financing may be at a sub-market price, because the company 
may have imprecise knov^ l^edge of market prices. Beyond the first investment 
its investors will guard against “bargain” purchases by outsiders. In another 
study (Keeley and Turki [8]) we classified a sample of 186 venture capital 
transactions as market, inside or unknown, and found that non-market 
returns differed from market returns in the directions one would expect, but 
the above-market returns offset the below-market returns. That is, using 
transactions, some of which do not have new investors, does not bias the 
data. It introduces extra variance in the returns, however.
Venture Capital Stock Purchases as Options on the Underlying 
Company: Because a few financing steps will be needed before a company 
is self sustaining, an early stock purchase is a type of option. It gives the 
buyer the right to make subsequent investments and eventually to own the 
self sustaining company. Referring to Figure 1, and assuming that failure 
at 1-2, II-2, III-2, IV-2, or VII-2 all result in a fixed payoff (possibly zero), 
the value of the company’s stock can be modeled using Geske’s [6] expression 
for a compound option . Symbolically,
V(t) =  Value of the underlying company; that is, the present value of 
the company discounted at the time when it needs no further 
financing—tvii-i+. The “+ ” means the instant after tvii-i.
K(i) =  Investments required at i=  ti, tn, tm, tiv,tvii.
S(t) =  Value of the company’s equity 
=  f{V(t);K(i), tvu>i>t)
If we make the common assumptions that V(t) follows an Ito process, that 
markets are dynamically complete, that transactions are costless and the 
interest rate (r) is constant, then S(t) also follows an Ito process.
dV =  /iv(V,t) dt + av(V,t) dB where B is a Standard Brownian Motion.
dS =  Us dt + Os dB
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where
Ms ■“  MvSv + ^  Ov Sw + St 
O^s Sv Cfv
(Sv,Sw,St) are respectively the first and second partial derivatives of S with 
respect to V, and the paurtial derivative of S with respect to t.
As a redundant security the time path of S will follow the familiar partial 
differential equation:
CTv Sw + rVSv + St — rS =  0
If V does not follow an Ito process, then the stock price S will not follow 
one either. Ito processes are widely assumed for public stocks, and V(t) will 
be public beyond step VII-1. This suggests that V(t) may be an Ito process 
prior to going public, although it will not be observable. On the other hand, 
the tendency of venture capitalists to identify discrete stages seems in keeping 
with a process that incorporates large jumps in prices. Although not 
observable, V(t) will be the discounted value of E[V(tvii-i)], where E[] refers 
to an expectation. Young, public companies usually pay no dividends, so 
V(tvii-i) will itself be a discounted value of some later (say at t=T) expected 
value of the stock. If V(t) after tvii-i is an Ito process, as we observe with public 
stocks, the updating of E[V(T)], say in the instant following tvii-i, must also 
be an Ito process.
Prior to tvii-i, when the company is private, the value, V(t), will still 
be the discounted value of E[V(T)]. If the updating of E[V(T)] follows an 
Ito process after tvn- i, we might expect it to follow the same process before. 
The act of going public does not change the nature of the business.
On the other hand, one may argue that very early in a company’s life, 
a few events can make or break it. For example, the maker of a new data 
storage device needs to secure a few large customers early to give it credibility, 
and to establish its product as a de facto standard. The expected value of 
its future cash flows, and therefore E[V(T)] as well, might jump 
discontinuously depending whether it wins or loses a given order early in 
its life (say soon after tm). That is shortly after tm we may jump E[V(T)], 
the forecast of value at a much later date, up or down depending on whether 
the company wins or loses a big, early order.
This study, an early, exploratory examination of the price processes of 
new ventures, will try to assess whether V(t) may reasonably be assumed to 
be an Ito process with a constant Vciriance. To do so it will use two primary 
tests:
•  Do the outcomes at a stage (e.g. III-l and III-2 combined) distribute 
themselves in a manner consistent with the continuous evolution of 
value implied by an Ito process?
•  Does the variance observed for each stage tend to decline toward the 
value observed for young, venture capital backed public companies (i.e. 
companies which have reached stage VII-1)?
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The first test implies that combined rates of return for a stage will be 
roughly normally distributed. III-l alone will have good returns, and III- 
2 will have primarily low returns. But combining III-l and III-2 or IV-1 and 
IV-2 will produce a distribution of outcomes which follows an 
approximately normal distribution, if the underlying V(t) follows an Ito 
process. If it does not, the combined distribution may be bimodal, or show 
some other deviation from normality. A bimodal distribution seems 
consistent with the venture capitalist’s tendency to identify successes and 
failures, instead of saying the companies have a continuum of outcomes at 
any stage.
The second test is consistent with an option that moves increasingly 
into the money, as would be the case with a progression toward stage VII-
1. On the other hand, a small variance at the early stages would imply some 
other sort of evolution, perhaps one in which uncertainty is resolved later 
on.
4. DATA
The data sample consists of 203 firms obtained from three venture capital 
funds that primarily invested in technology-oriented companies. For 142 
firms, we had sufficient information to identify both the stages the firms went 
through, up to the date of data collection, and payoffs at most of those stages. 
For the remaining 61 firms, we obtained the firm’s outcome but were unable 
to obtain the payoffs.
Most firms, 182, entered the sample at the startup stage (stage II), eleven 
entered at the seed stage (I), nine at early marketing (III), and one at the early 
expansion stage (IV). Furthermore, for the firms that were still in existence 
at the time of data collection, we did not track their evolution beyond the 
final outcomes of Figure 1.
Along any branch between two adjacent stages, say j and (j-i), read as 
“i dash i” (e.g. II-1 or II-2), the firms are classified into three categories:
•  those firms entering the sample at stage (j-i), their number denoted by 
n(enter(j-i));
•  those firms at stage (j-i), n(j-i);
•  those firms beyond stage (j-i), n(beyond(j-i)).
Letting i= l denote success and i=2 denote failure, the probability of success 
at stage j is computed as:
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Prob(j -  1) =  ~  )^ + n(beyond (j ~  1) ~  n(enter (j -  1))
n(beyond j)
where:
j =  I to X per Figure 1
The probability of failure at stage j is, therefore, given by:
Prob(j-2) =  1 -  Prob(j-l)
The counts of companies at each stage are shown in Appendix A.
For the 142 firms on which payoff data were available, we collected 495 
stock prices which correspond to the prices at the different stages. These prices 
were mainly used to estimate the parameters of their generating process.
Assume that stock prices at each stage follow the same Ito Process^, that 
is, a diffusion process, of the following simple form:
dS =  jLiS dt + aS dB
where /x is the instantaneous drift per unit time, is the instantaneous 
variance per unit time, and B denotes a Standard Brownian motion in R. 
Then, using Ito’s Lemma, one can show that the continuously compounded 
rate of return r:
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(St2 \ / 1 2 aM
where At=t2-ti and n refers to the normal distribution (~ means distributed 
as). Then, as shown in Appendix B, the maximum likelihood estimators 
(MLE) for ju and are given, respectively, by:
- 1 -2 M =  ^  a + a
- 2 _  ^  Ati (ri — a f  
 ^ i=i N
where a. represents a weighted average of the continuously compounded rate 
of returns ri such that:
« — ^  where N is the sample size
'=1 2i=i Ati
Since the MLE for is a biased estimator, an unbiased estimator is 
constructed as:
^2 ^  ^  Ati in -  a f  
i=i N  -  1
Finally, to check that stock prices follow a stochastic process of the type 
described above, we constructed histograms from the z-scores of the 
continuously compounded returns and checked if the latter are normally 
distributed as suggested. The z-score for a given return was obtained using 
the following equation:
z-score =
o/  V  Ati
5. RESULTS
Figure 2 presents the estimated probabilities at each transition between 
stages. For example, a company that begins at a seed stage (stage I) has an 
85 percent likelihood of successfully moving on to stage II, startup. The 
likelihood of successfully moving from stage II to stage III is 97 percent, 
which implies that very few companies fail to develop their initial product- 
only 3 percent. The odds of success during initial marketing, stage III, fall 
considerably to 60 percent. They improve to 77 percent for stage IV, early 
expansion. That is, a venture capital backed company that reaches break­
even, the test for exiting stage III, has a 77 percent chance of doubling its 
sales soon thereafter. The last stage, stage VII of our model, when a company 
becomes a major participant in its industry if it succeeds at that stage, has 
a 64 percent chance of success.
Multiplying the above probabilities gives the likelihood that a company, 
starting at a seed stage, will become a major force in its industry. That figure 
is (0.85 ) (0.97) (0.60) (0.77) (0.64) =  0.24. Thus, a seed stage company, based 
on the experience of our sample, has a 24 percent chance of having 
uninterrupted success during its early years. Of the 203 companies in the 
sample, only 11 began with seed financings. The rest commenced with a 
larger startup financing, and their implied likelihood of reaching VII-1 is 
29 percent.
Considering events following a failure, V, VIII, IX and X, the 
probabilities of a success generally lie below 0.40 (Following III-2, only 24 
of 60 companies successfully completed the next stage; 18 closed without
98 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 2(2) 1993
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attempting a turnaround, and 18 turnaround efforts failed.) Any setback in 
the first several stages, even when the company has achieved profitability, 
apparently precludes a “fresh start,” in which the chance of success is as good 
as ever.
A failure at a later stage, for example at VI, does not necessarily imply 
that an early investment will lose money. That depends on the respective 
gains and losses of each stage. Figure 3 shows those payoffs using the average 
multiple of a hypothetical investment made at the beginning of a given stage. 
For example, if a company fails at early marketing (III-2), but remains in 
operation (V) the average multiple of an investment made at the start of early 
marketing (III) is 0.562, a loss in value of 43.8 percent. The average time, 
over which that multiple is earned, is 1.92 years.
From Figure 3 one can easily determine that only three outcomes lead 
to an average multiplier greater than 1.0 for someone who invests at startup 
(II). They are:
•  VII-1 with an average multiple of 24.16 which is realized after 6.48 years 
and has a likelihood of 0.286.
•  VII-2 with an average multiple of 5.08 which is realized after 7.84 years 
and has a likelihood of 0.162.
•  VIII-1 with an average multiple of 1.32 which is realized after 8.25 years 
and has a likelihood of 0.052.
By tracing all branches an overall expected multiple and rate of return 
can be determined for a portfolio of investments made at a given stage. 
Similar returns can be determined for other investment points such as early 
expansion (IV) or redirect (V). Table 2 summarizes the results of investing 
at stages II, III, IV, V, or VII. They show that startups (II) had the highest 
rate of return followed by early expansion stages (IV). When a company has 
failed at a given stage, investments in a turnaround effort lead to negative 
returns on the average for stages V, VIII, IX, and X (Table 2 shows results 
for V only). Of course, some turncirounds have positive returns, but on the 
average they do not.
Figure 3 shows that startup financings have a high multiple and a very 
low failure rate (The same may be said of seed financings, but we will ignore 
them because only 5 percent of our sample began with seed financings). 
Although it may appear that investors earn high returns for assuming 
minimal risks, success refers only to completion of design. Quite possibly 
investors are assessing the potential market and the ability of the managers 
during this stage. That is, they may be resolving risks beyond mere technical
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Table 2
Investment Performance vs. Stage of Investment
Investment Stage
Number 
in Sample
Expected
Multiple^
Annualized 
Rate of 
Return?'
Average
Holding
Time
Startup (II) 171 7.89 38.1% 6.4 years
Early Marketing (III) 165 3.44 26.8% 5.2 years
Early Expansion (IV) 78 2.82 29.6% 4.0 years
Follow-On (VII) 36 1.76 29.3% 2.2 years
Redirect (V) 42 0.12 -38.2% 4.4 years
Notes: =  Prob (success @ i) X EM (stage i+) + Prob (failure @ i) X EM (stage i-), where EM denotes expected 
multiple. That is, the expected multiples are computed by rolling back the tree in Figure 3.
" = (Expected Multiple)*'^ *’'™" -1
issues. More generally, dividing each stage into successes and failures creates 
an appearance of a binary process, where one may not exist.
Instead of a binary separation, we may examine returns for all companies 
at each stage. In particular, if private companies experience the same 
processes as public companies, rates of return from stage II to III, or from 
III to IV should be normally distributed, and distributions looking only at 
successes (e.g. III-l) or failures (e.g. III-2) should be non-normal, because 
they will be decidedly nonrandom samples of the underlying distribution. 
Figure 4 displays histograms for the stages having reasonably large samples,
II, III, IV, and V, showing success/failure splits. The combined stage looks 
decidedly more normal than the splits. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to 
reject normality in all four cases even at significance levels of 0.20. Thus, 
the evidence fits the hypothesis of an underlying Brownian motion.
Some evidence exists for isolated jumps in value. Four cases fall beyond 
the 0.001 significance level, considerably more than would be expected for 
our sample of 325 returns. Two of those apply to one company, that first 
jumped upward and then downward. Possibly that case resulted from 
mispricing. Even so, the remaining two cases, both negative, suggest that 
large changes occur occasionally.
The results do not imply a Brownian motion with constant variance 
necessarily. Conceivably, the variation becomes large near the end of a stage. 
That is, variance may change with time. Additionally, the option-like nature 
of an investment in a new company means the variance will change 
depending on the movement of the company’s value. However, the initial 
evidence suggests that a stage represents a continuous unfolding of 
information about the company’s prospects, not a bifurcation into a 
successful and an unsuccessful path. The evidence also fits the view that a
Risk-Return Profiles of New Ventures 103
c
? S 8 S ®
S
^ 8 2
a
O 00 NO  ^C4 o
I6
I  ^  ^o
s z  
- >
l/>
iC/>N(D
'S
'o
c/3
5cd
6  
Q
a;
3Ml
s
N
ec
IN
a
>0 tT O'* O
5*3
n
os
ro aw
M
sro-
sri-
s-z
- > ts « <s — o
enN1-1
k S
tH
a
SI
aS-0
s
ro-
rl-
ST
->
I
a
fO <N
S 'Z
SI
so
ro-
...
S’Z
->
young private company and an established public company differ mainly 
in the observability of their values, not in the underlying events which 
determine how those values evolve.
Figure 5 estimates the parameters for the assumed Ito process at stages
II, III, IV; and V, for which the sample size is large enough to obtain 
estimates. Two returns are shown: the drift of the process (jx) and the mean 
of the implied normal distribution of returns (a =  Ji 0.5a^), as well as 
the standard deviation of the process (a). These estimates use continuous 
compounding at all stages. Drift rates and volatilities are higher than are 
typical in public markets.
We view the data in Figure 5, particularly the standard deviations, as 
valuable because they provide data which may allow the extension of 
option pricing approaches to new ventures. The similarity of price 
processes for public and private companies also suggests that our 
parameters for startups may represent reasonable standards for new 
ventures within established companies as well.
The standard deviations of the process do not appear to evolve steadily. 
They drop after the startup stage (II) but do not trend downward. The high 
variation at the initial stage, 95 percent of our sample started at stage II, 
and the high returns may reflect varying degrees of underpricing at the 
initial transaction. At that point a company often has limited knowledge 
about valuation; whereas, at all later points it has its own venture capitalist 
experts as members of the board of directors. Additionally, in the absence 
of an investor group a company often has little staying power, which hurts 
its bargaining position. An appearance of underpricing may also result 
if a low initial price serves to compensate investors for services that they 
subsequently provide (e.g. expert advice, introductions to customers).
The standard deviations of these private early stage companies are above 
those of venture capital backed startups, that have become public. Using 
weekly data Punjabi [11] found standard deviations averaging about 55 
percent per year for a sample of 48 such companies. Although higher, they 
seem to be in a reasonable range, between 76 and 99 percent per year. The 
higher variations for private companies, not yet mature enough for public 
markets, may reflect the optionlike nature of early stage investments. They 
may also stem from the inclusion of transactions in which no outside 
investors participated, a process which we believe increases variation, 
although it does not bias the averages (Keeley and Turki [8]). On the other 
hand, the absence of trading diminishes any volume based volatility, which 
would tend to raise the standard deviations of public companies vis-a-vis their 
private counterparts.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This study explores the nature of financial risks and returns in young, private 
companies. Its primary objective is to compare the evolution of value in such 
companies with the evolution found in public companies. Logic suggests 
that the processes should be similar, regardless of the age of the company, 
and this database of 203 venture capital backed start-ups provides empirical 
support for that logic.
The stages of development, v^hich venture capitalists readily identify, 
give an appearance of a binary process, characterized by large jumps up or 
dov^n in value at infrequent intervals. Hov^ever, this database shows the 
continuous variation of prices within a stage, supporting the view that their 
evolution follows an Ito process, similar to that for public stocks.
The estimated standard deviations of the process lie above those of 
slightly more mature, but otherwise similar, public companies, a result 
which seems reasonable. The standard deviations do not drift steadily 
downward to meet the values of public companies, as one might expect.
The data also provides evidence on the returns on venture capital 
investments separated by stages. Previous data has generally reported on 
venture capital portfolios, which are mixtures by stage, holding period, 
and investment amount. The information from this database more closely 
matches the nature of data on public securities. Returns, assuming the 
investment is held until the final stage of the development “tree” outlined 
in Figure 1, range from 38.1 percent per year for investments at stage II 
to 26.8 percent per year for investments at stage III. Investments after a 
company had suffered a setback show negative expected returns.
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APPENDIX B
Given that n is normally distributed with mean (jLt-0.5a^ ) and variance a /  
Ati, then one can construct a likelihood function for an N-size sample as:
N
ni=iL(/i,a^,ri) =  (27ra )^ H  VAt; exp
_  Ati(ri -  M 
2a^
The corresponding log likelihood function is: 
logL(/i,a\ri) =
-  y-log(2ir) -  log(<,') + 1- I  log (At,) -  ^  I  At, (r, -  M + 0.5oV
The MLE for n and are the solutions to:
dn
dn
That is,
logL(M, ri) =  0
1
i X  - 2  Ati(r; -  M + 0.5a') =  02a
N 1 ^  ^  ^ 1 ^
~  ~  2(a')' 5  ~  ^ ~ ~  ^ti(ri -  M + 0.5a') = i2a"
Rearranging and solving for ju and a ' yields the desired results.
It is straightforward to show that the second order conditions are satisfied 
by /i and a'. Mainly,
a'logL 
a'logL
d{o^f
(9'logL
a i=i
2x2dixd{a ) 'liO
=  0
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